How effective could a peace resulting from American mediation between the DRC and Rwanda be in the long term? An objective answer to this central question necessarily involves recalling the role and responsibility of the USA in the occurrence of the Great Lakes crisis, which encompasses the reversal of the geopolitical balance of power in this region from the takeover of Uganda by Museveni to the current situation.
This march also goes through the role played, directly and indirectly, by successive American administrations (Georges Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden) in the events preceding Rwanda’s independence, in the negotiations and conclusion of the Arusha Accords, in the assassination of Habyarimana and the outbreak of the Genocide, with Operation « Support Hope », the overthrow of the Mobutu regime, the hunt for the FDLR up to the ongoing peace negotiations.
This third part of our report covers this entire journey.
For three decades, the United States of America has been no stranger to the violence that has shaken the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has its roots in a series of geopolitical choices dating back to the Rwandan civil war (1990-1994). At the center of this story is a discreet but constant actor: the United States of America, whose decisions—often behind the scenes—have contributed to reshaping the region… but also to plunging it into a spiral of chaos.
1990-1994: The RPF, Uganda and the American shadow
When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda from Uganda on October 1, 1990, it was not a spontaneous insurrection. This movement, composed mainly of exiled Tutsis, was trained and equipped within Yoweri Museveni’s Ugandan National Army (NRA). Museveni was then a key ally of Washington in a Central Africa undergoing a post-Cold War reconstruction.
Although no official document proves a direct transfer of arms from the United States to the RPF, several concordant reports (NGOs, journalists, former military personnel) show that American training and military assistance programs intended for Uganda indirectly strengthened the capacities of the units that supported the RPF.
Paul Kagame, the linchpin of the American clean hands strategy
In this American clean hands strategy, Paul Kagame (settled in Uganda at the age of 3 with his parents who had fled the 1959 killings in Rwanda) will be the central pivot, both through his military training in the USA and his strategic role within the Ugandan army.
In 1990, in fact, as the RPF was preparing to launch its offensive against Rwanda from Uganda, Paul Kagame (then deputy leader of the RPF) was training in the United States. He attended a training course lasting several months at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth (Kansas), an American military school that trains foreign officers in command, strategy, and military intelligence techniques.
This training is part of a military cooperation program between the United States and Uganda (the country where Kagame was an officer at the time).
When RPF leader Fred Rwigyema was killed at the start of the October 1990 offensive, Kagame left the United States in a hurry to take command of the RPF and lead the war against the Habyarimana regime.
Role in the Ugandan Army (NRA)
While he was training in the USA, Paul Kagame was part of the National Resistance Army (NRA), the army of Yoweri Museveni who had taken power in Uganda in 1986. He held the position of military intelligence officer (Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence).
In this capacity, he is responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence, as well as coordinating networks of exiled Tutsis integrated into the Ugandan army.
This position allows him to forge strategic links with the Ugandan security apparatus and with Western intelligence services, including the Americans, who already supported Museveni as a key partner in East Africa.
Kagame’s American training, combined with his experience in Ugandan military intelligence, will thus contribute to shaping the RPF’s command style as observed both in the interventions of its special forces in the DRC and the behavior of the various rebellions that Rwanda supports (AFDL, CNDP, M23, etc.):
asymmetric warfare strategy,
effective use of intelligence networks,
communication and lobbying with Western partners.
These skills were decisive for the RPF’s military victory in 1994 and Kagame’s lasting establishment as a central player in the region.
At the same time, Washington pursued a clear diplomatic line: undermine President Juvénal Habyarimana, a staunch French ally, and force Kigali into a power-sharing arrangement. The 1993 Arusha Accords—brokered under intense U.S. and UN pressure—mandated RPF integration into Rwanda’s political and military institutions, weakening Habyarimana’s government even as the RPF retained its battle-ready forces in the north.
The result was a powder keg: Habyarimana, isolated and squeezed by IMF and World Bank reforms, faced a destabilized state teetering toward catastrophe.
1994: « Support Hope » : Humanitarian Mission or Strategic Footprint?
After the Tutsi genocide (April–July 1994), Rwanda lay in ruins. The RPF, now led by Paul Kagame, seized power as roughly 1.5 million Hutu refugees—including ex-FAR soldiers and Interahamwe militiamen—fled across the border into Zaire (now DRC).
Enter Washington’s Operation Support Hope (July 22 – September 1994), deploying nearly 4,000 U.S. troops across Kigali, Goma, and Entebbe (Uganda). Officially, the mission was humanitarian:
delivering water, food, and emergency aid,
setting up field hospitals,
assisting UN agencies and NGOs.
Yet Support Hope also served strategic ends:
Massive intelligence gathering on Zaire-based refugee camps, where ex-genocidaires regrouped into armed networks.
Tightening U.S.–RPF military and logistical ties, leveraging Uganda as the regional pivot.
Establishing a lasting U.S. foothold in the Great Lakes, countering French influence (France ran its own Operation Turquoise simultaneously).
In just two months, Washington secured a durable military and political presence in a region on the brink.
1996–1997: Toppling Mobutu, Washington’s Indirect Hand
The refugee camps in Zaire quickly became rear bases for ex-FAR and Interahamwe, threatening Rwanda’s security. While the international community stalled on dismantling them, Kigali and Kampala moved to act militarily.
Nothing unfolded without at least U.S. acquiescence—if not quiet facilitation:
intelligence and logistical frameworks built since Support Hope were repurposed,
diplomatic cover muted global criticism,
Washington voiced no objections despite the scale of the offensives.
This set the stage for the creation of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Backed militarily by Rwanda and Uganda, and with Washington’s tacit approval, the AFDL swept across Zaire, ousting Mobutu Sese Seko in just seven months (October 1996 – May 1997).
For the United States, the calculation was straightforward: shed an obsolete Cold War client (Mobutu), empower newer, “reliable” partners (Kagame and Museveni), and secure privileged access to Congo’s strategic minerals.
1998–2025: The Legacy of Endless Instability
Since then, eastern DRC has remained a perpetual warzone. The hunt for the FDLR (descendants of the ex-FAR), recurring rebellions (RCD, CNDP, M23), and repeated Rwandan and Ugandan incursions all trace back to the geopolitical upheaval of 1994–1997.
Today, Washington casts itself as a mediator, yet its policy is deeply ambivalent:
continued funding and training for Rwandan and Ugandan forces,
close military cooperation through AFRICOM,
restrained political pressure, with no meaningful sanctions for cross-border meddling.
For many in Kinshasa and across Congolese civil society, the U.S. is no longer a neutral broker but an enabler of the very crisis it seeks to solve, prioritizing strategic partnerships and mineral access over real stability.
What U.S. Mediation Must Mean in 2025
Washington’s role in the Great Lakes can no longer be confined to press releases or ceremonial leader summits. To restore credibility and finally break a 30-year cycle of bloodshed in eastern DRC, U.S. mediation must become tougher, more balanced, and results-driven.
First, all U.S. military and financial assistance must be strictly conditional. Every dollar or training program directed to Rwanda, Uganda, or even the DRC must hinge on verifiable commitments: respect for borders, withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese territory, dismantling of illegal armed bases, and an end to covert support for rebellions like M23. Without such leverage, peace will remain illusory.
Second, Washington must fully leverage its intelligence and logistical capabilities, proven effective since Support Hope in 1994, to identify and neutralize all armed groups—FDLR, M23, and other militias alike. Intelligence sharing must underpin joint international operations aimed at restoring security for civilians rather than shielding allies.
Finally, the U.S. must enforce a clear, enforceable roadmap, backed by concrete sanctions: travel bans and asset freezes targeting military or civilian leaders who sabotage peace agreements. Credible mediation cannot rely on cosmetic neutrality; it demands visible action to show Washington is no longer shielding its allies at Congo’s expense.
Only by adopting this firm, impartial, and measurable approach can the United States shed its reputation as an architect of 30 years of chaos and emerge as a genuine force for lasting peace in the Great Lakes.
(To be continued)
